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TORTS-DAMAGES-MISSOURI ALLOWS PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION. Rinker v. Ford Mo/or Co., 567 S.W.2d
655 (Mo. App. 1978). Plaintiff sustained personal injuries from a colli-
sion occurring when a used automobile she was test-driving continued
to accelerate after she removed her foot from the accelerator. Plaintiff
asserted that the immediate cause of the accident was the breakage of
the fast-idle cam, which in turn jammed the throttle.' During the pre-
ceding four-year period, the manufacturer had received twenty-nine re-
ports of similar occurrences involving the same model automobile. 2
Plaintiff brought actions against the dealer, alleging strict liability, and
against the manufacturer on alternative theories of strict liability and
negligent failure to warn. The jury found for both defendants on the
strict liability claims, but found against the manufacturer on the negli-
gence theory, awarding $100,000 in compensatory and $460,000 in pu-
nitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed and held- (1)
punitive damages are recoverable in products liability cases; and (2) the
jury properly could have found a conscious disregard of a real danger
sufficient for an award of punitive damages based on defendant's inac-
tion in the face of the reports of similar occurrences. 3
Allowing punitive damages in civil suits has generated considerable
controversy among courts4 and commentators.5 The objections stem
of allfatal motor vehicle accidents, and in I1 percent of injury accidents. (Dept. of Cal. Highway
Patrol (1976) Ann. Rep. of Fatal and Injury Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents, p. 68)." Coulter v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
1. Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo. App. 1978). Inspection of the car-
buretor after the accident indicated that the cam was broken. Id. Witnesses testified that when
the accelerator was pushed to the floor, the broken cam rotated into a position that jammed open
the fast-idle lever. A mechanical engineer testified that the design of the carburetor was inade-
quate because the cam was too small to withstand loads placed on it and because there was no
stop to prevent rotation. A chemical engineer testified that the cam was made from a material too
weak for its purposes. Id.
2. Id. at 663. A letter from Ford's Director of Auto Safety to the United States Department
of Transportation, pursuant to the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1976), was admitted into evidence to show defendant's knowledge. The letter contained the
names of 29 other Ford owners who, from December 24, 1968, to June 27, 1973, reported throttle
jammings on cars equipped with the same model carburetor. Id.
3. 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978).
4. Compare Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (the idea of punitive damages as a civil
remedy is a "monstrous heresy") with Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 238-39, 147 N.W. 18, 20
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from the award's similarity to criminal penalties. Critics argue that pu-
nitive awards destroy the symmetry of the civil-criminal distinction,6
impose "criminal fines" without constitutionally required safeguards,7
and provide a windfall8 to plaintiffs.9 Despite these arguments, all but
four states now allow punitive damages in some civil actions.' 0
Courts have been slow, however, to extend punitive awards to prod-
ucts liability actions, as demonstrated by the paucity of reported
cases." In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 12 Judge Friendly, writ-
(1914) ("punitory damages may be given in a civil action, although the defendant may have been
punished criminally for the same act").
Missouri at one time rejected punitive awards as an undesirable invasion of criminal sanctions
into civil jurisprudence. McKeon v Citizens' Ry., 42 Mo. 79 (1867). Since 1873, however, with
the decision in Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo 304 (1873), Missouri has allowed punitive damages in
various tort actions, including negligence. See, e.g., Sharp v. Robberson, 495 S.W.2d 394 (Mo.
t473) (indifference to or conscious disregard fbr safety of others); Hoene v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 487 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1972) (malicious prosecution); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461
S W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970) (nuisance). Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1967)
(fraud), Carries v. Thompson, 48 S.W 2d 903 (Mo. 1932) (assault); Helming v. Adams, 509 S.W.2d
159 (Mo, App. 1974) (false imprisonment).
5. E.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages. An Annotated Argumentative Outline,
I1 FoRum 57 (1975); Duffy, Punitive Damages.- A Doctrine Wtuich Should be Abolished, in DE-
ENsE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE C-%SE AG-XlNST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros
cds. 1969); Morris. Punitive Damages in Tort Cases. 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1931). See also
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liablit Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258 (1976).
6. Fay v. Parker, 53 NH. 342, 382 (1873). Contra, Owen, supra note 5, at 1278.
7. Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
4018 (1967). But see Vollert v. Summa Corp.. 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Toole v. Rich-
,irdson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
8. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, 233 N.Y.S.2d 478, 494
(1961) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
9. Hodgen & Veitch, Puntire Damages-Reassessed, 21 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 119 (1972).
10. See Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949); Vincent v. Morgan's La. &
T R. & S S. Co.. 140 La. 1022, 74 So. 541 (1917): Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218 Mass. 582,
10o N.E. 680 (1914); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co.. 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Boyer v.
Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878); Anderson v. Dalton. 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952); Spokane Truck
& Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891).
For a discussion of the development in Missouri. see note 4 supra; Comment, Punitive Damages
in Mfissour, 42 Mo. L. REV. 593 (1977). See generalh' Morris, supra note 5.
11. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 913
t 1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389
F. Supp, 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Barth v- B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228.71 Cal, Rptr. 306 (1968); Toole v. Richard-
on-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., 116 111. App. 2d 109. 253 NE.2d 636 (1969), af'd, 46 111. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970) See generaly Owen, supra note 5, at 1326 n.333, 1328 n.334; Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021
j1970).
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ing for the Second Circuit, pointed to the potentially large number of
plaintiffs in products liability actions' 3 and questioned whether "claims
for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be administered so as to avoid overkill."' 4
In Rinker, however, the court found these objections insufficient to
distinguish products liability actions from other torts, given the award's
purposes of punishing aggravated misconduct and deterring similar ac-
tions,15 and asserted that adequate judicial controls already exist to
protect defendants from excessive awards.' 6 The court also found that
the punitive award was proper on the facts of the case. Missouri law
requires a showing of legal malice before punitive damages may be
awarded in civil cases.' 7 Plaintiff sought punitive damages under a jury
instruction that requires "complete indifference to or a conscious disre-
12. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
13. Judge Friendly raised several policy objections to the award of punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability cases. First, because of the courts' inability to control the size of awards, excessive
punishment might be meted out to manufacturers of other safe and beneficial products. These
punitive awards, multiplied by the large number of suits that may arise from a single defective
product, may bankrupt a corporation for a single misdeed. Second, multiple compensatory dam-
age awards and criminal sanctions would serve as sufficient deterrents. Third, because the major-
ity of products liability defendants are corporations, unfairness is inherent in severely punishing
stockholders for management decisions. Id. at 839-41.
14. Id. at 839.
15. 567 S.W.2d at 668.
16. Id. at 669. Many states, including Missouri, require that punitive damages bear a reason-
able relation to the injury or compensatory damages. See Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp..
409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo. 1966). See also Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D.
Pa. 1974) (remand on damages). Other legislative limitations include awards only to the extent of
counsel fees and disbursements, Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930), limitations
to an amount that will fully compensate plaintiff for injuries, Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2
Mich. App. 288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71,
289 A.2d 66 (1972), and the complicity rule, Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1967). Judicial controls include granting new trials on the issue of damages, Pease v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974), and offering plaintiff the
option of remittitur or a new trial, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967). See generally Owen, supra note 5 at 1315-23.
- 17. Legal malice requires either (I) intent to do a wrongful act with knowledge of the wrong-
fulness, Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1966); Schmidt v. Central
Hardware Co., 516 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App. 1974), or (2) action displaying such disregard for others
that conscious wrongdoing may be implied, Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d
719 (Mo. 1966); Gerharter v. Mitchellhill Seed Co., 157 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 1941),
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gard for the safety of others."'" Accordingly, the court noted that the
jury reasonably could have found that the automobile's defect consti-
tuted a threat to public safety, and that "[t]he jury had the right to
weigh Ford's inactivity against the hazard presented and could well
conclude that Ford consciously or knowingly elected to disregard what
it well knew to be a genuine potential for danger."' 9
Rinker is significant not only because it is the first Missouri appellate
decision to uphold punitive damages in a products liability action, 20
but also because it sets a lower threshold of culpable conduct at which
a court may award punitive damages. An examination of previous
products liability cases upholding awards of punitive damages indi-
cates that the Rinker standard allows these awards for somewhat less
culpable behavior.2' One commentator has suggested that manufac-
turers' culpable conduct falls into five categories:22 (1) fraud (conceal-
ment of known defects), (2) knowing violation of safety standards, (3)
inadequate testing or quality control, (4) failure to warn,23 and (5)
18. 567 S.W.2d at 667. Missouri Approved Jury Instruction 10.02 reads:
Damages-Exemplary--Conscious Disregard for Others
If you find the issues in favor of plaintiff, and if you believe the conduct of defendant
as submitted in Instruction Number - (here insert the number of plaintifs verdict di-
recting instruction) showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety
of others, then in addition to any damages to which you may find plaintiff entitled under
Instruction Number - (here insert number of plaintiffs damage instruction) you may
award plaintiff an additional amount as punitive damages in such sum as you believe
will serve to punish defendant and to deter him and others from like conduct.
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY IN-
ssTRUCTIONs § 10.02 (2d ed. Supp. 1978).
19. 567 S.W.2d at 668.
20. Mclntyre v. Everest & Jennings. Inc., 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1978) (recognizing the issue
as one of first impression in Missouri).
21. See notes 11-12 supra, note 25 infra.
22. Owen, supra note 5,at 1329.
23. Owen, swpra note 5,at 1345, notes that a large proportion of products liability cases are
decided on this theory. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use andAbuse of Warn-
ings in Products LiabiliI--Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495
(1976), where the authors demonstrate that cases that should be decided on the ground of defec-
tive design and manufacture are frequently decided on a negligent-failure-to-warn theory, because
it is the easier ground to prove. They argue that when a warning cannot reduce the risk of harm
and would only result in nonmarketability of the product, "then the true issue before the court is
the acceptability of the design." Id. at 501.
In cases involving failures to adequately warn of known defects, however, defendants were able
to escape punitive damages when they provided a warning, even though the warning was not
sufficient to reduce the risk of harm in the particular instance. See Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc.,
536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
Number 11
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postmarketing failure to remedy known dangers.24 Each of the cases
upholding awards of punitive damages contained several of these mis-
deeds.25 In Rinker, however, there was no finding that the defendant
knew or should have known of the defect at the time of manufacture;
the only evidence supporting the award of punitive damages was de-
fendant's inaction in light of a known postmarketing defect.26
If other states follow Missouri's lead, it is likely that courts will more
readily award punitive damages in products liability actions, which will
present difficult line-drawing problems between negligent behavior that
24. Owen, supra note 5, at 1361. The remedy will depend upon.the nature of the defect and
will take the form of either a warning or a recall with a change in design for future manufacture of
the product.
25. In Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975),
there was arguably fraudulent conduct, knowingly inadequate design, inadequate testing, failure
to warn both before and after marketing, and a failure to remedy after marketing. Id. at 106. In
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973), the court held that the issue of puni-
five damages should have been submitted to the jury because the jury might have found that the
manufacturer inadequately tested its drug for a new use, neglected to test despite reports of a
connection between its product and permanent eye damage, misrepresented its knowledge of
harmful side-effects, and failed to warn in a manner calculated to reach physicians. Id. at 147. In
Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591 (opinion deleted from official reporter),
131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976), although the award of punitive damages based on fraud was reversed
on other grounds, the jury awarded both punitive and compensatory damages to a plaintiff injured
by defendant-manufacturer's snow vehicle. Evidence showed that inadequate testing failed to
disclose the true nature of a hazard of which defendant should have known, a misrepresentation
of its capabilities, and an inadequate warning of the danger. 60 Cal. App. 3d 591 (opinion deleted
from official reporter), 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976). Similarly, in Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38
Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974), though the jury award of punitive damages was again
denied on other grounds, the trial court awarded punitive damages because the manufacturer
knew before marketing of a defect rendering its airplane dangerous, but failed to warn users. Id.
at 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 426. In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967), the court found evidence of inadequate testing, possible falsification of test re-
sults to the FDA, manufacture and distribution despite indications of harmful side-effects, and
continued marketing without warning to users even after acquiring firm evidence of a connection
between the product and serious eye injury. Id. at 695-702, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-08. In Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., 116 II. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), there was inadequate design and
testing, failure to warn and failure to remedy after notice ofpostmarketing injuries. Id. at 124-32,
253 N.E.2d at 643-46.
26. Conceivably, Rinker falls into the category of defective design cases decided erroneously
on a negligent-failure-to-warn theory. See Twerski, supra note 23, at 534-35. If so, then the cul-
pable behavior actually consists of negligent manufacture, most likely resulting from inadequate
testing and a failure to warn or to remedy the defect upon becoming aware of it. However, in light
of the fact that the jury refused to impose liability based on strict liability in tort, and seemed to
have trouble finding the product "defective," 567 S.W.2d at 659-60, it is equally plausible that the
jury perceived a need to punish and deter inaction in the face of a known postmarketing defect,
and thus did extend the scope of a manufacturer's liability for punitive damages.
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affords only compensatory awards and behavior that warrants punitive
damages.
PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
RULE 4(c) CRITICIZED. Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1979). The
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States (Advisory Committee) has proposed a major
amendment to the federal rules governing who may serve process in
federal courts.' Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pres-
ently requires that a United States marshal, his deputy, or a special
court appointee serve process.' The proposed amendment would ex-
tend rule 4(c) by also permitting service at the plaintiffs election "by a
person authorized to serve process by any statute or rule of the state in
which the district court is held or in which service is made."'3
Through the amendment the Advisory Committee seeks to eliminate
a "troublesome ambiguity" '4 within rule 4. While the current rule 4(c)
requires service of process by a United States marshal, rules 4(d)(7) 5
i. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF "THE UNITED STATES, REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT PROPOSAL].
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c) provides:
By Whom Served. Service of all process shall be made by a United States marshal, by
his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except
that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve
process shall be made freely when substantial savings in travel fees will result.
3. DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at I. Amended rule 4(c) would read:
By Whom Served. Service of process shall be made by a United States marshal, by his
deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except that
a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve process
shall be made freely. At the election of the plaintiff service of process may be made by a
person authorized to serve process by any statute or rule of the state in which the district
court is held or in which service is made.
4. Id. at 2. See Farr & Co. v Cia. Intercontinental de Nay. de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342 (2d
Cir. 1957); Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1956); Bonan v. Leach, 22 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Ill.
1957); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1083, at 334 (1969 &
Supp, 1978).
5. FED. R. CiV. P. 4(d)(7) provides:
(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivi-
sion of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the
manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of summons or other like
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